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KEY POINTS 
• Services trade is often regarded as a niche or specialty but in fact it constitutes a sizable share of overall trade 
and is economically significant in many respects.  Whilst the financial sector is arguably an area of specialisation 
in the UK, trade in business services is quantitatively even more important.
• Services trade covers more than the international exchange of digitised services, it also encompasses 
investment flows as well as the movement of consumers and service professionals.  The UK runs a sizable trade 
surplus in cross-border services trade and is an attractive location for foreign investment.  As a result of this 
revealed comparative advantage, the surplus from cross-border services trade partly offsets the trade deficit in 
the realm of merchandise goods.  More than half of the value added of UK total exports in 2011 consisted of 
domestic services.
• Brexit negotiations should seek to preserve the conditions that currently sustain this favourable situation, 
particularly as services are becoming increasingly important for the performance of the UK’s manufacturing base 
and its trade competitiveness.  
• The EU Single Market for services may be imperfect but it goes a long way towards facilitating the exchange 
of services amongst members.  Thus, Brexit will almost surely be associated with a deterioration in market access 
conditions for UK providers; however, the extent of that change is difficult to gauge for two reasons.  First, applied 
services trade policies in the areas of cross-border trade, investment, and movement of people are typically 
more liberal than what the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) commitments would prescribe.  
Second, unlike for goods trade, there is no uniform EU services trade regime for suppliers from outside the EU.  
Hence, upon leaving the EU access to EU markets for UK service providers is likely to deteriorate in a way that 
differs across EU member states, sectors, and modes of supply.
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INTRODUCTION
Trade in services is the dark matter that, well, matters.  
It is economically significant for several reasons, partly 
because it directly affects UK consumers’ welfare in 
such sectors as telecommunications, health or retail 
distribution, and partly because producer services such as 
finance, transportation or professional services are inputs 
into both the production and international exchange of 
goods.  In addition, because of the UK’s comparative 
advantage in many services sectors, including but not 
limited to the financial sector, services trade makes a 
positive contribution to the UK’s current account.  
Consequently, Brexit will have important repercussions 
for the UK’s economic ties with the EU in the realm 
of services markets, yet gauging Brexit’s effects 
comprehensively is not straightforward.  The complexities 
of understanding services trade emanate from three 
principal features: 
1. Services are traded via multiple ‘modes of supply’ 
(see glossary at the end) that each feature entirely 
different regulatory environments.  It is not enough to 
simply look at cross-border trade in services; instead, 
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AN OVERVIEW OF UK SERVICES TRADE
The international exchange of services can occur through 
multiple channels, which are often linked both from a 
business as well as a policy making perspective.  
CROSS-BORDER TRADE
Cross-border trade in services (or ‘mode 1’) involves the 
direct exchange of a service, often in digitised form, and is 
relatively well captured in balance of payments statistics.  
In 2014 the UK exported a total of about £220 billion 
services and imported £130 billion, thus running a sizable 
surplus in terms of cross-border services trade (Table 
1).  Thus the value of cross-border services exports is 
quantitatively important – services exports constitute 43% 
of total UK exports (goods and services) whereas services 
imports account for one-quarter of total imports.  
Table 1 shows the different categories in which cross-
border services trade is recorded in the balance of 
payments.  It can be seen that services trade is much 
broader than financial services. In particular, one of 
the most traded category (“Other business services”) 
encompasses a rich set of producer services such as 
research and development, design, marketing, or brand 
management.
Whilst the UK is running a sizable trade deficit in goods, 
both overall and with the EU, the British economy exports 
more than twice as much ‘other commercial services’ than 
it imports.2  The largest components therein are business 
and financial services, respectively.  The provision of such 
services is likely associated with high skilled jobs. 
In terms of geographic orientation, relative to total 
world exports and imports of services, about one-
third of UK services are exported to the EU3 and 
one-half of all services imports originate from the 
EU.  These shares underscore how tightly the UK is 
intertwined with continental Europe.  Transportation and 
Telecommunications exhibit particular high export shares 
directed towards the EU, owing probably to those sectors’ 
intrinsic link with goods trade.  At the same time, Asia is 
also an important region with which the UK exchanges a 
range of distinctly ‘producer input’ type of services.4  
It is important to note that the value of services trade, 
and its share relative to goods trade, refers to cross-
border trade in services only.  These figures do not include 
2, ‘Other commercial services’ exclude the categories of Travel, 
Transportation and Government services, respectively, for which the 
notion of a trade balance is not as straightforward to interpret.
3, This share rises to nearly 50% if Switzerland is included, which is a 
major destination for UK financial services exports.
4, Comprising of ‘technical, trade related, operational leasing and other 
business services.’
flows of capital, people and goods are all intrinsically 
linked to services trade.1 For example,
- Services can be brought to consumers by foreign 
providers establishing a commercial presence, in which 
case all the regulatory provisions governing inward 
investment apply.
- Professionals may travel abroad to discharge their 
services locally, in which case a host of professional 
qualification and certification issues arise.
- A substantial share of the value of traded 
merchandise goods consists of services, so that any 
impediment to goods trade has potential indirect 
effects on embodied services.
2.  There are no explicit measures of either transport 
costs or trade protection; instead, nearly all measures 
affecting service trade are of a regulatory, ‘behind-the-
border’ nature that are difficult to keep track of, let 
alone assess their potential impact on services trade.
3.  Policy-making roles and responsibilities are much 
more scattered across governmental agencies than in 
goods trade.  Neither is there one department/ministry 
for services trade policy within each country, nor is 
there one uniform EU services trade policy towards 
external partners.
This Briefing Paper elaborates on these aspects so as to 
highlight how Brexit might directly and indirectly affect 
UK services trade and policy-making in this area.  The 
paper commences with a picture of current UK services 
trade across the various modes of supply.  The revealed 
strengths of the UK in services could usefully inform 
negotiating priorities going forward.  The Briefing Paper 
also provides an overview of prevailing services trade 
policies, showing how market access regimes differ across 
EU countries and across sectors.  A related aspect is 
preferential market access abroad outside of the Single 
Market.  The paper therefore provides an overview of 
agreements with services or investment provisions that the 
EU has concluded in the past.  It is likely that the UK will 
cease to be party to these agreements after Brexit.
1, This Briefing Paper focuses primarily on cross-border services 
trade (‘mode 1’) and establishing commercial presence (‘mode 
3’) as the quantitatively dominant conduits of services trade.  
Consumption abroad (‘mode 2’) is important mainly in sectors such 
as tourism, healthcare and education.  The temporary movement of 
service professionals (‘mode 4’) is closely tied to a country’s overall 
immigration/visa policies, and such trade as might occur is notoriously 
poorly captured in official statistics.  Even before the Brexit vote, in 
which “regaining control over immigration” was a major theme, both 
the UK and other European countries have traditionally been applying 
rather restrictive policies, and this is unlikely to change in the future.
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trade is quantitatively as important as cross-border 
services trade. 
In 2014 the UK’s international investment position in 
services sectors abroad stood at about £500 billion, 
having fallen relative to 2013, whereas foreign businesses 
held about £671 billion in domestic services sector 
firms, up by 18 percent from the previous year due to 
investments primarily from Europe and the Americas.5  
Half of the inflow from Europe went into information and 
communication industries whilst the rise from America 
was mainly driven by financial services industries.  Overall 
these figures demonstrate the UK’s strong position in 
attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); indeed, the 
inward stock of FDI (encompassing all sectors, not just 
services) amounts to 51 percent of UK GDP, which is 
appreciably higher than the world average (34 percent).6   
5, Source: ONS Statistical Bulletin – Foreign Direct Investment Involving 
UK Companies: 2014
6, Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016, country fact sheet 
United Kingdom, 2015 figures.
other forms of trading services, which will be discussed 
below.  The value of services trade in its entirety is likely 
to be much larger than cross-border services trade, even 
though not all parts are equally well-represented in official 
statistics.
COMMERCIAL PRESENCE 
Another principal way of trading services is for a foreign 
supplier to set up shop in another country so as to serve 
customers (consumers or corporate entities) locally.  
The value of services thus provided, i.e. through the 
establishment of a commercial presence, is captured 
in Foreign Affiliate Trade Statistics (FATS, or “mode 3” 
in GATS speak).  Unfortunately, FATS statistics are not 
widely available and it has instead become customary to 
rely on foreign direct investment (FDI) figures, for which 
somewhat better statistics exist albeit often not in a very 
detailed manner.  Comparing the value of services trade 
across alternative modes is fraught with difficulty, partly 
because of mis-measurement and partly because the 
relative importance of modes varies across countries and 
sectors. However, generally speaking mode 3 services 
Table 1: UK Trade in Goods and Services, by Sector and Destination, 2014
Exports Imports
World EU-27 World EU-27
Goods Value
(£ mil)
Share
(in total)
Value
(£ mil)
Share
(of EU-
28)
Value
(£ mil)
Share
(total)
Value
(£ mil)
Share
(EU-28)
of which: 295,432 57.3 147,618 50,0 419,104 76.2 226,480 54.0
Finished Manufactured 147,461 28.6 - - 210,782 38.3 - -
Semi-Finished Manufactured 76,928 14.9 - - 96,481 17.6 - -
Services 219,759 42.7 81,275 37.0 130,619 23.8 64,154 49.1
of which:
Transport 26,706 5.2 11,891 44.5 19,369 3.5 10,368 53.5
Travel 28,341 5.5 12,075 42.6 38,428 7.0 22,367 53.2
Construction 1,965 0.4 725 36.9 2,185 0.4 1,768 80.9
Insurance and pension 20,110 3.9 2,455 12.2 1,374 0.2 536 39.0
Financial 46,223 9.6 20,208 41.1 10,004 1.8 3,614 36.1
Intellectual Property 10,941 2.1 4,199 38.4 5,924 1.1 1,990 33.6
Telecoms, computer and infor-
mation 16,332 3.2 7,517 46.0 9,413 1.7 5,418 57.6
Other business 57,135 11.1 18,329 32.1 35,508 6.5 15,251 43.0
Personal, cultural, recreational 2,126 0.4 716 33.7 3,143 0.6 284 9.0
Government 2,471 0.5 524 21.2 4,203 0.8 1,763 41.9
Source: ONS Pink Book 2015; author’s own calculations.  
Notes: Figures refer to 2014.  ‘-’ denotes not available.  ‘Services’ encompass cross-border trade in services as per the 
UK balance of payments.  Relative shares of goods and services refer to total trade in merchandise goods and services, 
respectively (not current account totals).
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billion Euro).  In 1995 that ‘mode 5’ share stood at 28%.  
Hence, not only is trade in embodied services inputs large 
in absolute terms, its share has been increasing by 23 
percent.  These intermediate services inputs originate 
from domestic services production that, in turn, could 
either be supplied by domestic service sector firms such 
as banks or transport enterprises (e.g. HSBC or British 
Airways), or alternatively supported by FDI, e.g. Bank 
of America (UK) or the UK affiliate of UPS.  This latter 
case represents an example of inbound mode 3 services 
trade facilitating outbound mode 5 services trade.  As it 
happens, it was the British economy that recorded the 
largest increase in the share of high-skilled labour in 
manufacturing value added (+10.2 percentage points) 
over 1995-2008 of all advanced economies.9  Given 
that many producer services are skill-intensive activities, 
and that a good deal of manufacturing value added is 
exported, this development could indicate that ‘mode 5’ 
services trade has become more and more relevant for the 
UK economy.
It is evident that for such trade to flow smoothly, two 
seemingly unrelated policy instruments, namely the UK’s 
policy towards inward investment as well as the export 
destination’s goods trade regime, would need to align 
in a suitable way.  The case of ‘mode 5’ services trade 
illustrates that goods and services production appear 
to be ever more intertwined in a technology-intensive 
manufacturing base.  For trade policy to support this 
development, the demands for coordinating hitherto 
unrelated areas of policy-making may be rising.  In a 
nutshell, the variety and quality of available services plays 
an ever more important role in making manufacturing 
competitive.
THE UK SERVICES SECTOR AND 
SUPPLY-CHAIN TRADE
Over the past two decades, the UK economy has 
continuously deepened its integration into international 
production fragmentation, and the services sector is 
assuming a key role in this process.  Conceptually, 
economies participate in ‘Global Value Chains’ (GVC) 
by importing foreign inputs to produce the goods and 
services they export (henceforth called ‘backward GVC 
participation’) and also by exporting domestically produced 
inputs to partners in charge of downstream production 
stages (called ‘forward GVC participation’).  Between 
1995-2011, the share of foreign value added content in 
UK exports rose from 18.2% to 23%, whilst the share of 
domestic value added sent to third countries rose from 
19% to 24.7%.10  Thus these figures, which are most 
9, See Timmer et al. (2014), Table 4.
10, Source for all figures in this section: United Kingdom profile “Trade 
in Value-Added and Global Value Chains”, based upon the OECD-WTO 
TiVA Database and available from the WTO website: https://www.wto. 
org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/GB_e.pdf
Some of this investment might directly benefit British 
consumers (e.g. the local presence of firms such as 
Lidl, a German retailer, or Santander UK plc, a wholly 
foreign owned British bank).  For business services, EU 
membership was perhaps one contributing factor drawing 
inward investment into the UK, for instance by foreign 
firms seeking to serve UK manufacturing activity, which 
itself benefitted from the Single Market.  Often large 
service providers are shadowing large manufacturing firms 
as they expand their operations geographically.  As such, 
Brexit could alter the rationale for at least some of the 
investment that has previously been flowing into services 
sectors.  
The effect of Brexit on outward FDI of Brexit may be 
more muted insofar as local establishment is often a 
precondition for providing services and is not easily 
reversible.  That said, establishment in professional 
services sectors often takes specific forms such as 
partnerships, which are reliant on the recognition of 
qualifications or experience.  The potential lapse post-
Brexit of facilitating Single Market legislation such as 
the directive on Mutual Recognition of Professional 
Qualifications could have a detrimental effect on mode 3 
trade in certain services sectors.
EMBODIED SERVICES INPUTS
In addition to the four modes of supply as conventionally 
set out in the GATS framework, services are also 
effectively traded as embodied inputs into a country’s 
merchandise exports.  This has sometimes been called 
‘mode 5’ services trade.7  The phenomenon can be seen 
as part of a wider secular trend called ‘servicification’, 
which refers to firms increasingly using external service 
providers in support of their principal economic activity, 
typically manufacturing.  This could take the form of 
‘domestic outsourcing of activities such as accounting, 
design, or marketing, which were previously done in-
house.  Yet there is nothing to prevent such services from 
being procured from abroad via any of the conventional 
modes of delivery.8  In any event, independent from where 
service inputs originate, ‘mode 5’ trade highlights the fact 
that, partly as a result of servicification, a good deal of 
gross merchandise exports consists of domestic services 
content.
Whilst this particular kind of services trade is not widely 
appreciated, preliminary evidence suggests that it is 
quantitatively important.  Based on TiVA statistics, 
Cernat and Kutlina-Dimitrova estimate that as of 2009 
nearly 35% of EU-27 gross merchandise exports in fact 
represented services inputs (equivalent to over 300 
7 See Cernat and Kutlina-Dimitrova (2014), Figure 5.
8  Mode 2 does not seem practical in this regard but modes 1, 
3 and 4 are all potential avenues for obtaining such services from 
abroad.
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likely an underestimate of the current situation as they 
do not include the most recent rebound years after the 
Great Recession, show that both forward and backward 
GVC links have become stronger.  Services have been a 
key driver of this development (Table 2), in particular by 
forging forward linkages.  This shows that UK services are 
an important input into downstream production located 
abroad.  The prevalence of forward linkages underscores 
the salience of market access for UK services exports.
Table 2 demonstrates that more than half of the value 
added of UK total exports in 2011 consisted of domestic 
services value added (52.1%).  At the same time, total 
UK exports also contained 11.4% of foreign services 
value added.  In terms of dynamics, these two value 
added shares of UK total exports—domestic and foreign 
services—have each grown by 7 percent every year over 
the period 1995-2001.  It is not surprising that services 
value added constitutes the majority of services exports, 
but even with regard to UK manufacturing exports as 
a subset of total exports, domestic services contribute 
21.3% to value added, and a further 15.8% are foreign 
services.  Overall, domestic services are underpinning 
export performance in a crucial way, even though the 
import side, i.e. securing foreign services as inputs into 
UK exports, appears to be nearly as important.  
A final point worth emphasising is the upstream position 
of UK services trade.  Considering the UK’s forward GVC 
participation, i.e. domestically produced inputs that go 
on to be exported to third countries via at least one other 
partner economy, the top three industries are all services 
sectors.  These are “other business services” (22.9%), 
“wholesale and retail trade” (11.8) and “financial 
intermediation” (10.3), respectively, with their percentage 
share in total exports of domestic inputs given in brackets. 
The top destinations are Germany, Ireland and China, thus 
highlighting again the dominant role of EU trade partners 
for forward linkages.  By contrast, there is no service 
sector amongst the top three industries for backward GVC  
participation, i.e. imported foreign inputs for UK exports.11 
SERVICES TRADE POLICY 
POLICIES GOVERNING THE UK—EU 
RELATIONSHIP
The EU’s policy-making competencies were recently 
broadened when, as part of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, 
FDI became part of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy.  
As far as services trade policy is concerned, it is still the 
case though that across all four GATS modes of supply, 
the EU merely provides for a framework of rules, from 
which individual EU member states deviate when it comes 
to market access and national treatment in their domestic 
markets.12  This is true for both applied policies as well as 
GATS commitments, and the extent of such derogations 
between member states differs appreciably across sectors. 
What does this mean for the UK’s future access to the 
European market?  To begin with, the EU’s GATS schedule 
of commitments defines the legally binding conditions 
that would apply to the UK as a WTO member in its own 
right in the absence of any other arrangement.  There are 
two implications of this ‘fall back scenario’ that are worth 
11, The top three GVC-importing industries are chemicals, motor 
vehicles, and petroleum products, respectively.
12, Specific commitments in the GATS are undertaken in terms of 
market access (Art. XVI) and national treatment (Art. XVII).  The former 
refers to the absence of quota-type restrictions such as limitations 
on the number of service suppliers, on the total value of service 
transactions, or on the number of service operations or natural persons 
that may be employed, amongst others.  National treatment refers 
to non-discrimination accorded to services and service suppliers of 
any other countries in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services.
Table 2: Domestic and foreign Value-Added Contribution to Gross Exports in the UK, 2011
Domestic Value Added Foreign Value Added Total
Exporting sector
Primary 
products
Manu-
facturing
Services
Primary 
products
Manu-
facturing
Services
Total 5.3 19.7 52.1 4.2 7.3 11.4 100.0
Primary products 65.4 2.9 14.4 7.3 3.2 6.8 100.0
Manufactures 2.8 40.2 21.3 7.1 12.9 15.8 100.0
Services 0.5 2.3 85.7 1.2 2.5 7.8 100.0
Source: WTO: UK profile “Trade in Value Added and Global Value Chains”, cf. footnote 10. 
Note: Figures denote percent shares of sectoral value added in industry total gross exports.
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It is between these two corner outcomes—the actual 
policies towards non-EU countries and the status quo (ie. 
full access to the Single Market)—that there is space that 
could potentially be exploited during negotiations on a 
future UK-EU trade agreement.  It is worth remembering 
that—pursuant to GATS Art. II:1—external services trade 
policies are applied on an MFN basis, thus any preferential 
access to the EU market that the UK might seek 
would need to be part of a comprehensive agreement.  
Otherwise, pursuant to GATS Art. V the EU would be 
obliged to immediately extend the conditions granted to 
the UK to all other WTO members, which is rather unlikely.  
Within that future agreement, whatever form it might 
take, a roadmap for the UK’s negotiating agenda could 
probably be derived by squaring the currently applied 
policies per sector and mode with the specific export 
interests of UK firms as evidenced by trade flows under 
relatively undistorted Single Market conditions.  Apart 
from negotiating the terms of market access and 
national treatment for services, the mutual recognition 
of professional qualifications and, indeed, the mutual 
accreditation of regulatory agencies would be a separate 
negotiating matter.
Information from the World Bank’s Services Trade 
Restrictions Database (STRD) sheds some light on the 
varying degree of openness in major services sectors 
across 20 of the 28 EU member states, including the UK 
(Figure 1).15  The Services Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(STRI) depicted in Figures 1 and 2 aims at capturing the 
restrictiveness with respect to services trade of a country’s 
applied policy regime, based solely on available policy 
information.16  Because of the Single Market and the 
four freedoms, EU member countries are distinctly more 
open vis-à-vis each other compared to non-EU countries.  
In order to capture the two-tiered nature of policies in 
this context, the STRI score for individual EU countries 
represents a trade-weighted measure of openness; 
since EU countries trade a lot with each other, their STRI 
scores are typically driven by the more open preferential 
policies.  In contrast, the artificial entity “EU-EXT” captures 
EU member countries’ average policy towards non-EU 
providers, whereas “EU-INT” is a simple average of EU-
internal policies.
15, All information contained in the STRD can be accessed at http://
data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/services-trade-restrictions.  In principle 
the Database focuses on countries’ MFN policies as of 2009.
16, The STRI score is constructed by assessing policy regimes for each 
subsector-mode combination in their entirety, and assigning values 
on an openness scale from zero to 100 in intervals of 25, with zero 
denoting ‘completely open’ and 100 denoting ‘completely closed’ (ie. 
no entry allowed at all).  STRI scores are aggregated to the country 
level using appropriate sets of modal and sectoral weights, respectively. 
For further details see Borchert et al. (2014).
keeping in mind.  First, most WTO founding members of 
the GATS did not make very ambitious commitments on 
market access and national treatment, therefore trading 
on GATS terms is typically rather undesirable.13  At the 
same time, countries are free to apply more liberal 
policies than they committed to under the GATS, and 
many do, so that actual MFN policy regimes typically 
afford (much) better market access than what GATS 
schedules would prescribe.  This phenomenon is known 
as ‘commitments overhang.14   As a result, market access 
and national treatment for the UK as an ordinary WTO 
member may be somewhat worse compared to the status 
quo as an EU member yet in reality, it may not be as bad 
as GATS schedules might suggest.  In any event, it needs 
to be borne in mind that applied MFN regimes lack the 
legal certainty and predictability of membership in the 
Single Market. 
Policies that apply to services trade amongst EU 
economies are likewise more open than applied policies 
towards third countries such as the US or Japan.  An 
additional feature is that applied policies could—and 
do—vary across EU member states, reflecting the fact that 
there is not one uniform EU external services trade policy 
towards non-members.  Rather, individual EU member 
states at times apply different policies for service suppliers 
from within versus from outside the EU.  Hence, post-
Brexit UK suppliers will face a new set of actual market 
access conditions in EU markets across services sectors 
and modes of supply, respectively, and there is no simple 
rule to gauge the incremental change in actual market 
access conditions. 
An example may help illustrate how the difference 
in conditions within and outside the Single Market 
differs across sectors.  Consider for instance the retail 
distribution sector, in which there is basically no difference 
for retailers from within the EU and outside the EU, 
respectively, when it comes to establishing commercial 
presence in any EU country.  In principle, the same is true 
in the telecoms sector, except for France where non-EU 
persons or firms cannot hold more than 20 percent of 
voting shares in firms operating radio-based infrastructure. 
As a counter-example, the situation is widely different 
in the legal sector, in which policies range from no 
restrictions for establishing a commercial presence in ten 
member states to Austria where only licensed lawyers from 
EEA countries may open branches.  Five member states 
require EU/EEA nationality or admission to the Bar in an 
EU member state for lawyers to temporarily move to an EU 
country to advise on foreign law. 
13, Countries that newly acceded to the WTO post-1995 typically 
made broader and deeper GATS commitments as part of their overall 
accession negotiations.
14 Thus named in analogy to the ‘binding overhang’ that exists for 
tariff rates on goods.
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The quantification using STRI scores affords at least a 
qualitative picture of differences in services trade policies 
across EU countries and sectors (Figure 1).  First, average 
external restrictiveness (26) is higher than policy barriers 
within EU members (18).  Second, there is a good deal of 
variation in applied policies across EU countries, with the 
UK being amongst the most liberal members on average.  
Thirdly, the overall scores shown in Figure 1 are primarily 
driven by investment policies (mode 3), partly because 
mode 3 is quantitatively important and partly because of 
the incidence of policy measures affecting investment.
The country-level scores shown in Figure 1 obfuscate the 
fact that the picture is rather different in professional 
services sectors, in which trade restrictions arise mostly 
from regulation on the movement of natural persons as 
service suppliers (mode 4).  Here policies across the 
20 EU members are appreciably more restrictive (STRI 
scores ranging between 50-60) and more diverse.  In this 
particular area, Britain’s score of 60 is slightly higher than 
the internal average (57).  Policy restrictions on mode 4 
are prevalent despite the free movement of persons as 
stipulated by the Single Market.  Legislative actions such 
as the Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications 
directive did go some way towards facilitating mode 4 
trade, therefore an exit from the Single Market would be 
likely to have substantial ramifications for the ability of 
service professionals to move to or from EU-27 countries.
A first impression about the differences in market access 
within the EU can be obtained by juxtaposing policy 
restrictiveness across major services sectors (Figure 
2).17  The average external EU’s regime and the UK’s 
policies are set against those of three adjacent and large 
economies (Germany, France and the Netherlands).  
Several observations can be made: EU economies are 
generally fairly open in financial services, telecoms and 
retailing, both vis-à-vis each other and towards non-EU 
providers.  It is in professional services sectors (and to 
a lesser extent transportation) where access for foreign 
providers is restricted.  That said, there are differences 
across countries: for instance, in transportation sectors 
the UK imposes the same minor restrictions as the 
other EU countries depicted (ranging from 19-25) but 
providers from outside the EU face more restrictions 
17 The STRI scores for the two professional services sectors, Legal 
and Accounting/Auditing, depict policy restrictiveness with respect to 
the movement on natural persons (mode 4). 
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Figure 1:  Trade Policy Restrictiveness: country-level STRI scores
Source: World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Database
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(37).  That wedge is even more pronounced in the legal 
and accountancy professions (via mode 4).  Lawyers 
and accountants looking to provide such services in 
the EU are up against major restrictions (67 and 50, 
respectively).  Whilst the UK individually is as restrictive as 
the EU’s external regime, other markets such as France 
and the Netherlands tend to be more open for service 
professionals from within the EU.  These advantages to 
UK service suppliers would potentially be lost post-Brexit if 
“EU-EXT” policies were applied to UK firms. 
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Figure 2: Trade Policy Restrictiveness, by sector
Source: World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Database
PREFERENTIAL POLICIES OUTSIDE THE 
EU
With respect to services trade and investment, the UK 
has preferential access to a range of foreign markets 
through bilateral or plurilateral agreements that the EU 
has negotiated in the past on behalf of its membership.  
The number of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA)18 for 
services is not as large as the number of merchandise 
goods FTAs.  Still, the consideration that the UK would 
lose its preferential access to these markets after it left 
the EU applies in like manner to services and investment 
too.19 Currently there are 14 services agreements in 
operation that the EU has concluded with third countries 
or blocs, including South Korea, Mexico, Chile and Central 
18, There is a range of terms used to denote agreements that have 
provisions relevant for services trade and investment, including Services 
Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) or Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs), and individual agreements such as CETA or TTIP that feature 
investment provisions.
19, See UKTPO Briefing Paper #2: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/bmec/
documents/briefing-paper-2.pdf.
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America.20
In addition, a trade and investment agreement with 
Canada (CETA) has just been completed and awaits 
ratification.  The prevailing legal view is that post-Brexit 
the UK would not be able to continue as party to these 
agreements and would need to renegotiate.21  Given the 
relative geographic and language proximity between the 
UK and Canada, it is not inconceivable that an EU without 
the UK fundamentally alters the attractiveness of the 
deal from Canada’s perspective; of course this depends 
on the yet-to-be-determined future relationship between 
the UK and EU-27.  It could provide a taster of a broader 
squall line if other countries felt that Brexit unfolded in 
a way that impairs their existing rights or commercial 
advantages.  Conversely, though, if properly managed 
CETA could provide a template for dealing with this 
unprecedented situation in other bilateral and multilateral 
settings.
Going forward, the EU is currently engaged in negotiations 
with nine bilateral (trade and) investment agreements 
including the largest players such as the United States, 
Japan, Indian and China.  In particular, negotiations with 
China aim at replacing the 26 existing Bilateral Investment 
Treaties between individual EU member states and China 
by one single comprehensive investment agreement.  This 
is an example of a case in which the UK is going to miss 
out on the EU’s hefty bargaining power when forging an 
agreement.  If these negotiations came to fruition, the 
remaining 27 EU members would transition to a new 
agreement whilst post-Brexit, the UK would be left with 
its 1986 BIT with China.  The UK could of course aim at 
negotiating an upgrade too, but the balance of negotiating 
power in this bilateral relationship would be rather 
different.
Currently the European Commission is also acting on 
behalf of its members in the plurilateral Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA) negotiations.  The UK would presumably 
want to (re-)take its place as a standalone member in 
that forum after leaving the EU.  Whilst TiSA is formally 
open to all WTO members, access does not appear to 
be automatic (China is understood to be interested in 
joining but has not yet become part of the talks).  Again, 
this would suggest that the UK will have to rely on some 
goodwill for continued access to the single most important 
plurilateral forum for services trade negotiations.  In any 
event, meaningful engagement therein will require staff 
resources and expertise previously provided by the EU 
Commission.
20, The full list includes: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
CARIFORUM States (EPA), Central America, Chile, Colombia and Peru, 
FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Rep of Korea, Mexico, Montenegro, Rep of 
Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.
21, Eg. Sir Alan Dashwood QC, Cambridge University, in testimony to 
the HoC Foreign Affairs Committee.  See http://data.parliament.uk/
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-
affairs-committee/the-costs-and-benefits-of-uk-membership-of-the-eu/
oral/25756.pdf.
The UK is also party to about 180 bilateral treaties with 
investment provisions,22 some 31 of which are not—or 
not yet—in force.  For instance, Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) or other Association Agreements 
currently under negotiation all pass for BITs in UNCTAD’s 
comprehensive inventory.23
22, Mostly BITs but also FTAs, EPAs or Association Agreements where 
relevant.  The number does not include such entries as the EC Treaty, 
the EC-EFTA Agreement, or the Energy Charter Treaty.
23, UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/IIA/AdvancedSearchBITResults (accessed 28 Sept 2016).
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CONCLUSION
Trade in services across its various modes of supply—cross-border trade, consumption abroad, investment, and 
movement of service professionals—constitutes a substantial part of UK international trade, particularly with respect to 
the EU.  Whilst the financial sector is arguably an area of specialisation in the UK, there is a host of business services 
such as legal advice, engineering, marketing or consulting for which as a whole the value of cross-border trade in fact 
exceeds that of financial services.  
Overall, the UK runs a sizable trade surplus in cross-border services trade, even though the share of services imports 
coming from the EU is larger than the share in overall UK services exports that goes to the EU.  That is, the UK 
exhibits a comparative advantage in services and the EU is one of its most important export markets.  At the same 
time, UK businesses benefit from the import of a range of business services as inputs into both the services and the 
manufacturing sector, respectively. 
The UK services sector has continuously deepened its integration into international production fragmentation, with the 
value added shares of domestic and foreign services inputs into UK total exports each having grown by 7 percent every 
year over the past two decades.  Partly as a result of this process, more than half of the value added of UK total exports 
consists of domestic services (as of 2011), underpinning the crucial role of services for export performance. 
Going forward negotiations with the EU should seek to preserve the conditions that currently sustain this favourable 
situation.  Services trade, including investment and the temporary movement of persons as service suppliers, is salient 
for the performance of the UK’s manufacturing base and its trade competitiveness.
Brexit will entail a change in the conditions under which UK businesses trade with the EU.  For services, gauging the 
extent of market access conditions is difficult because:
1. There are distinct regulatory frameworks—and political sensitivities—for cross-border trade, investment, and 
movement of people, respectively; 
2. The EU’s services trade policies applied to non-EU countries are typically more liberal than what the EU GATS 
commitments would prescribe, across all modes of supply; 
3. There is no uniform EU services trade regime for third country suppliers to begin with.  Access to individual EU 
markets for UK service providers is likely going to change in a way that differs across EU member states, sectors, 
and modes of supply.  Access to foreign markets other than the EU is also going to change insofar as the UK will 
most likely cease to be party to preferential services trade agreements that were concluded by the EU in the past, 
such as EU-Korea or, going forward, CETA.
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Trade in services
Exchange of services between residents of two 
different countries.  Compared to merchandise goods, 
services have unique characteristics that affect their 
tradability.  The two most obvious characteristics 
include intangibility and non-storability.  In addition, 
services typically also require differentiation and joint 
production, with consumers having to participate in the 
production process.  In order to capture these aspects 
and to allow for trade in services that also require joint 
production, the WTO defines trade to span four modes 
of supply.  In terms of global values, services trade 
represents about 20% of total trade (on a balance of 
payment basis), even though services account for over 
60% of global production and employment in most 
countries.  Due to measurement issue and the multiple 
modes of supply, official statistics are thought to be 
severely underestimate the value of services trade.
Service trade policy
Any legislative measure that has the potential to affect 
trade in services.  Such regulatory measures could be 
de jure non-discriminatory or discriminatory.  In the 
former case all suppliers irrespective of ownership are 
subject to the regulation (e.g. all banks have to have a 
certain amount of paid-up capital) whereas the latter 
applies to foreign suppliers only (e.g. foreign insurance 
companies may not sell life insurance).  Service trade 
policies could also be categorised by mode of supply, 
or whether they affect market entry of new suppliers or 
rather operations of incumbent suppliers.
GLOSSARY
GATS
The WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services.  
The GATS came into being during the Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations and entered into force in January 
1995.  Since January 2000, services have become the 
subject of multilateral trade negotiations.
GATS commitments
Are legally binding commitments inscribed in WTO 
Members’ GATS Schedule of Specific Commitments.  
Schedules identify the services for which a Member 
guarantees market access and national treatment and 
any limitations that may be attached.  Commitments 
are undertaken with respect to each of the four 
different modes of service supply.  Most Schedules 
consist of both sectoral and horizontal sections. The 
“Horizontal Section” contains entries that apply across 
all sectors subsequently listed in the schedule.
Modes of supply
Because many services are not storable, effective 
exchange (trade) of a service may require the proximity 
of supplier and consumer.  Thus it has become 
customary in the terminology of the GATS to take a 
broad view of trade in services to include not just 
cross-border trade but also international transactions 
through foreign investment or the movement of people.  
The different ways of trading services are known in 
GATS parlance as the four ‘modes of supply’:
Mode 1 – Cross-border: services supplied from the 
territory of one country into the territory of another, 
without either supplier or buyer/consumer moving to the 
physical location of the other.  Example: a blueprint or 
presentation sent electronically from India to the UK.
Mode 2 – Consumption abroad:  services supplied in 
the territory of one country to a resident of another 
country who moves to the location of the supplier(s).  
Example: tourism; a UK student going to France to 
study.
Mode 3 – Commercial presence: Legal persons (firms 
or any type of business) moving to the location 
of consumers to sell services locally through the 
establishment of a foreign affiliate or branch (often 
foreign direct investment).  Example: Retailers Lidl or 
Aldi opening shops in the UK.
Mode 4 – Presence of natural persons: services 
supplied by natural persons resident in one country in 
the territory of another by (temporarily) moving to the 
country of the consumer(s).  Example: A US lawyer 
traveling to the UK for 3 months to discharge legal 
advice.
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FURTHER INFORMATION
This document was written by Ingo Borchert.  Very helpful 
comments were gratefully received from Alan Winters, Peter 
Holmes and an anonymous referee.  Any remaining errors 
are the author’s. 
The UK Trade Policy observatory (UKTPO), a partnership 
between the University of Sussex and Chatham House, is an 
independent expert group that: 
1) initiates, comments on and analyses trade policy 
proposals for the UK; and 
2) trains British policy makers, negotiators and other 
interested parties through tailored training packages. 
The UKTPO is committed to engaging with a wide variety of 
stakeholders to ensure that the UK’s international trading 
environment is reconstructed in a manner that benefits all 
in Britain and is fair to Britain, the EU and the world. The 
Observatory offers a wide range of expertise and services 
to help support government departments, international 
organisations and businesses to strategise and develop new 
trade policies in the post-Brexit era.
For further information on this theme or the work of the UK 
Trade Observatory, please contact:
Professor L Alan Winters 
Director 
UK Trade Policy Observatory
University of Sussex, Room 280, Jubilee Building, Falmer, 
BN1 9SL
Email: uktpo@sussex.ac.uk
www.sussex.ad.uk/bmec/uktpo
Twitter: @uk_tpo
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